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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

STATE review(s) completed.

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25 November 1966

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Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009400140001-2

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Communist China: Serious charges against Chief of State Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping suggest a move has begun to bring them down in disgrace.

[redacted] a pamphlet issued on 23 November in the name of a Red Guard unit in Peking University demanded the dismissal of Liu and Teng. It alleged that they have opposed Mao Tse-tung's policies for 21 years, that Liu has been the leader of party opposition to Mao, and that Teng has been his leading supporter. The pamphlet said that Liu had opposed Mao's policy on peasants and that Teng had supported Soviet "revisionism." It charged that Liu had tried to undercut Mao as early as 1939.

Criticism of Liu and Teng has been reported from time to time since the 11th central committee plenum in August. The criticisms--made through Red Guard posters [redacted]

[redacted] have been mild, and have not suggested an intention to disgrace the two leaders.

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The earlier criticisms chiefly dealt with recent "mistakes" allegedly made during the course of the cultural revolution. Now, however, the fundamental nature of the charges, which verge on treason, implies a more serious intention on the part of the attacking forces--whoever they are.

The significance of an effort to thoroughly discredit Liu and Teng is that they have been dominant leaders in the party machinery under Mao for more than a decade. Many subordinate leaders at the party center and in the provinces thus owe their careers to the two, and could be in jeopardy if Liu and Teng are brought down on the present charges.

The regime has been asserting that it sought to remove only a very few individuals "in power," and has appealed to lesser opponents of the cultural revolution to come over to the revolutionary side, with a promise of lenient treatment. There is no evidence that this

appeal has met with significant response, and the violence of the new attack against Liu and Teng may be a sign that more drastic measures are intended against such opponents.

Although Liu and Teng lost ground at the August plenum, they have appeared in every major turnout of leaders since then--in eighth and sixth place respectively. They last were seen on 12 November at a ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth. At a Red Guard rally held on 10 November Liu chatted amiably with Mao on the reviewing stand.

The authoritative appearance of the pamphlet and the reported content of the charges.

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
[redacted] suggest that it was prepared under the direction of at least some senior leaders. Being only a Red Guard pamphlet, it does not fully commit whoever is behind the attack to take action. Nevertheless, a failure to follow through would be a setback for the attacking forces.

Signs of disorganization and differences among Red Guard units in Peking have been noted recently in many institutions, including Peking University. The dominant unit there, which probably produced this attack, has been one of the most militant and prominent Red Guard organizations in China, and is assumed to have been responsive to Mao and Lin.

Whether Mao supported this latest attack, however, is in question. Mao may have condoned the demotion of Liu and Teng in August, believing that they had tried to curb his cultural revolution movement. It is less certain, however, that he would approve the sweeping charges now being made, which reflect on his own leadership capacity over nearly a 30-year period.

In a possibly related development, it appears that Red Guards visiting Peking, who had been ordered to leave by the 21st, have stayed on in large numbers. According to press reports from Peking, another huge rally, first scheduled for 23 November and then for the 24th, has again been postponed.

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Jordan: Anti-Husayn demonstrations, some of which have called for the King's overthrow, have occurred in all the major towns in west Jordan during the past two days, and more serious disturbances are expected today.

The director of public security expects the peak of trouble to be reached today when Muslims assemble on their day of prayer, possibly to hear inflammatory sermons. The security chief is prepared to establish martial law throughout west Jordan if necessary, but he is not certain that it would enable the government to restore order.

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King Husayn, in a conversation with Ambassador Burns, has expressed his belief that future danger lies less in the demonstrations, which he believes can be controlled, than in the threat of assassination of government officials and the sabotage of government installations.

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The dominant theme of the demonstrations during the past few days has shifted from criticism of the government's performance during Israel's 13 November raid to specific support for proposals made by the Egyptian-oriented Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

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While the PLO's objective ostensibly is to "liberate" Palestine from Israel, it now is exploiting Husayn's difficulties in an effort to free Jordanian Palestinians from his control.

The PLO has broadcast communiqus on the situation in west Jordan, and one of them requested Jordanian security forces to "leave the people alone with their revolution." Another called upon Jordanian ministers to resign and leave Prime Minister Wasfi Tal "alone to meet his fate." A campaign against Tal also is being conducted in the Cairo press.

The avoidance of direct attacks on King Husayn may reflect uneasiness on the part of Nasir about the implications of a revolution against the King. Such an upheaval might lead to a war with Israel in which Nasir realizes he probably would be defeated. At the same time he clearly would like to capitalize on the turmoil in Jordan short of provoking the Israelis. By attacking Tal, a consistent opponent of Jordanian cooperation with Egypt, Nasir may hope to force Tal's removal and, thus, to weaken Jordanian opposition to Egyptian influence in Jordan.

Nasir's caution was evident in a speech he made yesterday. "We do not want to exacerbate the tension on the west bank of the Jordan," he said. "This particular line of our political and military confrontation with Israel requires that we fully assess matters."

The USSR so far also is treating the crisis with caution. Soviet propaganda has been relatively muted, although Moscow has made it clear it considers Israel--backed by the US--responsible for the tension. The US Embassy in Moscow notes that the Soviet press seems to be telling the USSR's Arab friends to take it easy on Jordan.

In Israel, Prime Minister Eshkol has ordered Israeli forces to exercise "maximum restraint" along the border in an effort to promote stability in Jordan, according to Foreign Minister Eban. Eban said this means there will be no reaction to further terrorist incidents.

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He also undoubtedly hopes that the 2,000 troops and four jet aircraft placed at his disposal by Saudi Arabia and Iraq will ease pressure on him to accept Egyptian aid. The Saudi and Iraqi gestures of political support have little military significance.

Jordan's decision on 23 November to conscript everyone between the ages of 18 and 40, another move toward greater preparedness, would appear to involve some political risk, since the country's dissident Palestinian majority presumably will attain increased representation in the army.

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Indonesia: Youth leaders are increasingly dissatisfied with the army's deliberation in moving against President Sukarno.

In west Java and particularly in Djakarta their frustration focuses on the army's refusal to condone continued student demonstrations against Sukarno.

[redacted] Partly as a means of diverting students from street action, Suharto plans to include youth leaders in his new appointments to parliament, which are apparently to be made later this year.

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In Medan, North Sumatra, students differ with the army on the Overseas Chinese problem. The army has now evicted the secondary students' "action command" from the former Chinese consulate, which the students had taken over as their headquarters. The army is also trying to stop harassment of Chinese, in which students are playing the primary role.

The disenchantment of student groups with the army's political tactics reflects the continuing fragmentation of the civilian front that supported the army's anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno campaign during the past year. Although deepening differences are likely between the army and civilian organizations, no unmanageable opposition to army policy from any source seems likely within the foreseeable future.

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European Communications Satellite: Germany has conditionally agreed to join France in developing a communications satellite system serving Europe and Africa.

German support was offered on the condition that the French satellite project not prove divisive to either the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) or the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT). The Germans insisted that ESRO build the satellite and asked that it be brought under the sponsorship of INTELSAT, whose members are committed to a single global INTELSAT system.

Behind this effort is the desire of Europeans to obtain a larger share of communications satellite business, now wholly American and the only sector of space investment that promises an early commercial return. European resentment of US domination of INTELSAT is growing and could generate more support for the satellite proposed by the French.

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NATO: Germany and France plan to settle the question of the legal status of French forces in Germany before the NATO ministerial meeting in mid-December.

Negotiators from the two countries are near agreement on an exchange of letters in which Paris would acknowledge that French troops remain only at German consent. Bonn would accept a formula proposed by the French providing for "appropriate" German consent to French troop movements in Germany.

The Germans had earlier agreed with their NATO allies to have their talks with the French parallel negotiations between General Lemnitzer and the French chief of staff over the mission of the French forces in Germany. [redacted]

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If French forces are to remain in Germany regardless of the outcome of the negotiations over their mission and relationship to NATO command, General Lemnitzer's bargaining position in those negotiations will be undercut. [redacted]

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Denmark: Denmark's swing to the left in Tuesday's election is a result of dissatisfaction with the Social Democratic government's domestic policies.

The extreme leftist Socialist People's Party (SPP), was the principal gainer, increasing from 10 to 20 seats its representation in the 175-member Parliament. The SPP advocates a neutral foreign policy, but its gains are attributed principally to discontent within Social Democratic ranks over the government's housing and rental programs. The Social Democrats, the major political force in Denmark for 30 years, lost 7 of their 76 seats in Parliament. The strengths of the four non-Socialist parties in Parliament changed little.

Prime Minister Krag, who has led a minority Social Democratic government for two years, has indicated that he expects to remain in office. Krag is probably counting on the continuing support of the "bourgeois" parties on foreign policy questions and on SPP support for his domestic program. Before the election, Krag opposed SPP participation in the government. As a result of the election, he may accept SPP participation, but only in a broadly based coalition. [redacted]

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Ecuador: The political situation remains turbulent.

Military leaders are becoming increasingly hostile toward the constituent assembly because certain delegates persist in attacking them. On 22 November the armed forces were placed on full alert, probably in reaction to a speech in the assembly by a Chinese-trained student leader attacking members of the military junta ousted last March. A proposed law under which the deposed junta members would be demoted and brought to trial is also disturbing the military.

Extreme leftists are trying to goad the armed forces into dissolving the assembly; they believe they would gain in the ensuing chaos. Military leaders realize this and are therefore hesitant to act, but their patience is waning.

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Uruguay: The general election on 27 November is shaking political stability.

Public discontent with the traditional parties, increased by recurrent political and economic crises under the governing Blanco party, is expected to bring substantial Communist gains. The opposition Colorado party, which otherwise might benefit from the Blancos' poor record, may find that the Communist electoral front, FIDEL, and other small leftist parties have eaten into its strength.

Voters will choose from a multitude of candidates for the one-man presidency that will be created if the referendum for constitutional reform passes, and also for the present National Council of Government, which will be retained if the referendum fails.

Public disappointment will be bitter if none of the four alternative proposals to replace the unwieldy council is adopted. Rumors persist that some politicians, with the tacit backing of elements of the security forces, might in that event seek to organize a coup to force a reform.

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